Municipal Corporations -- Constitutional Law -- Eviction From Public Housing Projects by Abel, Michael R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 47 | Number 4 Article 20
6-1-1969
Municipal Corporations -- Constitutional Law --
Eviction From Public Housing Projects
Michael R. Abel
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael R. Abel, Municipal Corporations -- Constitutional Law -- Eviction From Public Housing Projects, 47 N.C. L. Rev. 953 (1969).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol47/iss4/20
1969] EVICTION FROM PUBLIC HOUSING 953
tract terms.4 0 These union practices are not be condemned; they may in
fact be quite necessary. The legal implications of this practice, however,
may lead the courts to conclude that it presents too great a threat to good
faith bargaining and to the certified bargaining units to be sustained.
Union insistence upon employer acceptance of a coalition bargaining
committee therefore is not always protected by section 7 of the Act con-
trary to the Board's implication in General Electric. The detrimental
effect of this practice on the requirement of good faith bargaining may
have justified the employer's refusal to negotiate with that committee.
This conclusion, however, does not preclude the employer's consent to
the union's including "outsiders" on its committee. The propriety of
such consent has been recognized by the courts ;41 co-ordinated bargaining
is not illegal per se. Its use, however, should properly be limited to those
situations involving no threat to good faith bargaining.
42
RICKY LEE WELBORN
Municipal Corporations-Constitutional Law-Eviction From
Public Housing Projects
Public housing in the United States originated in the 1930's as part
of the larger effort to escape from the clutches of the Great Depression.
The Wagner-Steagall Act of 19371 signaled the entry of the federal gov-
ernment into the field of housing and, although amended many times,
remains in force today with its basic design still largely intact. Today,
more than one out of every one hundred persons in the United States lives
in federally assisted, low-rent public housing.2
"Id. According to Mr. Hilderbrand, taking wages out of competition among
unions is the most sought after goal of the unions.
" Cf. NLRB v. John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 401 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968) ; NLRB
v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966).
"' It should be noted that employers may join together in multi-employer associa-
tions for the purpose of collective bargaining, if done in good faith and with the
consent of the union, with each party retaining the right to withdraw from this
bargaining arrangement upon reasonable notice. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Local
449, 353 U.S. 87, (1957) ; Publishers' Ass'n of New York City v. NLRB, 364 F.2d
293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966); Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp &
Paper Mfrs., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (1967); Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B.
388 (1958).
" 50 Stat. 888 (1937), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1964), as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1402-21a (Supp. III, 1968).
'Rosen, Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, in HOUSING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS
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Although reformers had long urged public intervention to alleviate
the deplorable conditions of the slums, the Wagner-Steagall Act was moti-
vated "not so much as a matter of radical ideology, but out of a demand
for positive programs to eliminate the 'undeserved' privations of the un-
accustomed poor."3 This attitude resulted from the peculiar character of
the persons burdened by poverty in the thirties. In addition to the "prob-
lem poor" (the traditional uneducated, unskilled poor), there were millions
of persons whose style of living was reduced to the poverty level by
the Depression. These persons, formerly prosperous with a middle-class
outlook, constituted a "submerged middle class," 4 and it was this group
who initially benefitted from subsidized public housing.
The projects were for poor but honest workers-the members of the
submerged middle class, biding their time until the day when they
regained their rightful income level. The tenants were not to receive
any "charity." The difference between a dole and a subsidy is psycho-
logically powerful, whether or not the distinction is good economics.
The working class residents of public housing were not to receive a gift
from the government, but their rightful due as citizens. Public housing,
arguably, was no more "charitable" than the free land of the Homestead
Act of 1862-an earlier form of middle-class subsidy. Decent, sanitary
apartments were a stepping-stone -to a fee simple cottage-the Ameri-
can dream. Perhaps a radical fringe of housing reformers looked on
public housing as something more fundamentally "public"; but the core
of support lay in an old and conservative tradition.
Public housing activities were suspended during World War II. The
return of prosperity ended the phenomenon of a submerged middle-class
and consequently the demand for low-rent public housing by these per-
sons.6 "Public housing ... was relegated to the permanent poor in the
city, and to the new urban immigrants. ... [P]ublic housing was ex-
clusively for those who were certainly, indisputably, irreversibly poor."7
AND REMEDIES 154 n.1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Rosen]; see generally Fried-
man, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 642 (1966)




'Actually, many would have been content to remain in subsidized public housing
projects. However, pressures on the government by business interests resulted in
the abandonment of subsidized apartments for homes in the suburbs. Id. at 651.
7Id.
The texture of life in the projects changed for the worse; since more de-
linquent families lived in them, they were the locus for more and more de-
linquency. The attention of the public was now directed to public housing not
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Influx of the "problem poor" has altered the whole complexion of
public housing. The location in a public housing project of a poverty-
stricken family, with a history of substandard living spanning several
generations, cannot be expected to transform its members into a respectable
household with middle-class standards, values, outlooks and all the impli-
cations thereof. Consequently, public housing administrators have become
more and more rigid and paternalistic in their attitudes toward tenants.
As problems with tenants have multiplied, public housing officials have
become increasingly authoritarian in their approach. Tenants are
bound by complex regulations, much more stringent than those imposed
by private landlords. Admission and continued occupancy standards
are used as weapons for inculcating middle-class standards, and as
shields for protecting the image of the program.8
Public housing tenants have had little opportunity to challenge the in-
evitable injustices resulting from these attitudes. However, with the
recent explosion of legal services for the poor, public landlords can no
longer remain secure in the belief that their actions will continue to go
unchallenged.
One of the most onerous conditions imposed on tenants of public
housing projects is that they be content with short-term leases, almost
always providing for a month-to-month tenancy. By virtue of these lease
terms, housing authorities have contended that they may terminate the
lease of any tenant merely by giving the requisite notice to quit and that
they are under no duty to give any reason for the eviction. In Thorpe
v. Housing Authority,0 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to decide
whether a public housing authority may, consistent with due process, evict
a tenant for any reason or for no reason, and whether a tenant may be
as a hopeful program of reform but as the site of public folly and private
decay ....
Id. at 652.
' Comment, Government Houing Assistance to the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 508, 512
(1967). See Fortas, Equal Rights-For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 401, 413
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Fortas]; Friedman 655-56; Rosen 156.
' See Fortas 412; Friedman 660; Rosen 185 & n.67, 203-04. Public housing
authority admission policies have also been attacked. See Holmes v. New York
City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Friedman 656-59; Rosen 157-81.
Also contested have been rules and regulations promulgated by the authorities,
compliance with which is a condition to admission and continued occupancy. See
Lewis v. Housing Auth., 397 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1968); Rosen 224-46. Discussion
of these controversial policies is beyond the scope of this note." 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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evicted without being afforded an opportunity to contest the sufficiency
of the authority's reason for terminating the tenancy.
Petitioner Thorpe resided in a federally assisted, low-rent public hous-
ing project owned and operated by the Housing Authority of the City of
Durham, North Carolina. Petitioner's lease provided for a renewable
month-to-month tenancy and also provided for termination of the tenancy
by either party on fifteen days notice prior to the end of any monthly
term. On August 10, 1965, petitioner was elected president of a tenants'
organization, and on August 11 she was given notice that her lease would
be terminated at the end of the month. No reason was given for the
termination and efforts to ascertain the reason were unsuccessful.1 '
In defending against the Housing Authority's action for summary
eviction, petitioner asserted that she was being evicted for her organiza-
tional activities and that eviction for this reason would be in violation
of her first amendment rights. The North Carolina state courts sustained
the Housing Authority's power to evict petitioner, the supreme court
stating: "It is immaterial what may have been the reason for the lessor's
unwillingness to continue the relationship of landlord and tenant after
the expiration of the term as provided in the lease."' 2 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether petitioner was denied
due process.' While the case was pending before the Court, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Affairs (hereinafter HUD) issued a circular
concerning the termination of tenancies in public housing projects. The
circular provided that "no tenant be given notice to vacate without being
told by the Local Authority, in a private conference or other appropriate
manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given an opportunity to make
such reply or explanation as he may wish."' 4 The Supreme Court then
vacated the Thorpe judgment and remanded to the North Carolina Su-
preme Court for further proceedings in light of the circular.'" The North
Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous decision holding that
" Id. at 270-71 & nn.1, 2 & 3.
2 Housing Auth. v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 433, 148 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1966) (per
curiam).
Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 385 U.S. 967 (1966).
"Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. at 272-73 n.8.
Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967). In a concurring opinion,
Justice Douglas stated: "I would vacate and remand to the state courts to determine
the precise reason why petitioner was evicted and whether that reason was within
the permissible range for state action against the individual." Id. at 681.
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the circular was prospective only and thus was not applicable to the peti-
tioner's case."6
Once again the Supreme Court granted certiorari"T and reversed
the judgment, holding that "housing authorities of federally assisted
public housing projects must apply the ... HUD circular before evicting
any tenant still residing in such projects. . . ."'I Specifically, the Court
held that the HUD circular is mandatory ;i9 that the circular did not un-
constitutionally impair the Housing Authority's contract with HUD nor
the Authority's lease agreement with the petitioner ;2o and that the circular
is applicable to eviction proceedings instituted prior to the issuance of
the circular.2 1 Beyond these holdings, the Court's decision provides little,
if any, guidance as to what types of procedure would constitute compliance
with the HUD circular.2 2 Invoking the abstention doctrine,2 the Court
also failed to resolve any of the larger Constitutional issues concerning
the applicability of due process limitations to a public housing authority's
power of eviction.2 4
That a public housing authority is an arm of the state-usually termed
a municipal corporation, created for a public purpose, and invested
with a government function-is virtually undisputed.25 However, public
housing authorities have insisted that they stand on the same footing as
private landlords and thus are bound only by the terms of the lease agree-
Housing Auth. v. Thorpe, 271 N.C. 468, 471, 157 S.E.2d 147, 150 (1967).
'¢Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
18 393 U.S. at 274.
2° Id. at 274-76.
20 Id. at 277-81.
.1 Id. at 281-83. The Court noted that the Housing Authority had begun to com-
ply with the HUD circular but refused to apply it to petitioner because it had
decided to evict her before the circular was issued. Id. at 283.
2. In fact, the Court may have inadvertently minimized the effect of the circular
by quoting with apparent approval the Authority's contention that "the Circular
clearly does not say that a Housing Authority cannot terminate at the end of any
term without cause as is provided in the lease." Id. at 278.
3 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring).
2,393 U.S. at 270 n.2, 284 & n.49.
These same considerations lead us to conclude that it would be... premature
for us to reach a decision on petitioner's contention that it would violate due
process for the Authority to evict her arbitrarily. That issue can be more
appropriately considered if petitioner is in fact evicted arbitrarily.
Id. at 284 n.49.
-" E.g., Banks v. Housing Auth., 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953); Cox
v. City of Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940). Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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ments into which they enter." The courts have generally upheld this view
with the result that a public housing authority, like a private landlord,
may evict a tenant for whatever reason it chooses, subject only to the
provisions of the lease agreementY.2  It follows that where the lease does
not specifically provide for termination, a public housing tenant, in pos-
session under a month-to-month tenancy, can be evicted for any reason
merely by landlord compliance with the statutory requirements for the
termination of such tenancies.2s
In the fifties a notable exception to this general attitude grew out of
the public housing authorities' attempt to comply with the Gwinn Amend-
ment29 by requiring tenants to sign a statement to the effect that they were
not members of any organization designated as subversive by the Attorney
General. Failure to sign such a statement would result in eviction. The
courts consistently held that evictions based on such grounds were arbi-
trary and in violation of the tenants' constitutional rights."0
28 See Friedman 660-61; Rosen 184-85; Comment, Public Landlords and Private
Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesirables" from Public Housing Projects, 77 YALE
L.J. 988 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Public Landlords and Private
Tenants]. See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
" E.g., Brand v. Chicago Housing Auth., 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Housing
Auth. v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (1966) (per curiam); Housing
Auth. v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963). At times 42 U.S.C.
§ 1404a (1964), as amended (Supp. III, 1968), has been interpreted to authorize
such action. E.g., Walton v. Phoenix, 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P.2d 309 (1949). That sec-
tion provides that "any State or local public agency administering a low-rent housing
project ... shall continue to have the right to maintain an action or proceeding to
recover possession of any housing accommodations operated by it where such
action is authorized by the statute or regulations under which such housing
accommodations are administered . . . ." However, an examination of legislative
history shows that the provision was included to insure that a local authority could
evict a tenant who became ineligible for low-rent housing because of exceeding
maximum income requirements. See 93 CONG. REc. 6044 (1947). In fact, the
only ground for eviction from a public housing project mentioned specifically
in the federal act is eviction for "overincome." 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (3) (1964),
as amended (Supp. III, 1968).
2 E.g., the North Carolina statute provides for termination of a month-to-month
tenancy on seven days' notice prior to the end of any term. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-14
(1965).
0 " [N] o housing unit constructed under the United States Housing Act of 1937,
as amended, shall be occupied by a person who is a member of an organization
designated as subversive by the Attorney General." 66 Stat. 403, reenacted 67
Stat. 307, formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1411(c) (Supp. 1953), expiring with its omission
in 1955.
'0 Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Housing Auth. v.
Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956);
Chicago Housing Auth. v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954);
Kutcher v. Housing Auth., 20 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955); Lawson v. Housing
Auth., 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955).
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The Gwinn amendment cases contain an abundance of dicta concerning
limitations on the power of a public housing authority to evict a tenant
for no reason or for an arbitrary reason. Perhaps the most well-known
of these dicta is contained in Rudder v. United States3' where the court
stated: "The government as landlord is still the government. It must not
act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the require-
ments of due process of law. Arbitrary action is not due process."32
The effect of Rudder and similar dicta on subsequent evictions by public
housing authorities is not at all clear.3 3 For example, in Holt v. Rich-
mond Redevelopment & Housing Authority,3" the court enjoined the
eviction of a public housing tenant because it found that the tenant was
being evicted for his participation in establishing a tenants' organiza-
tion and for being elected its president. Citing Rudder, the court held
that eviction on such grounds would constitute an invalid infringement on
the tenant's first amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly. At the same time the court stated that a public housing tenant
has no vested right in his tenancy, thus implying that any reason not
constituting an infringement on constitutional rights would be sufficient
for eviction.
Consequently, when faced with eviction from a public housing project,
the tenant, in an attempt to ascertain his rights, must look to a vaguely-
defined HUD circular and to a series of cases on the subject that are
confusing and often inconsistent. Further clarification by the courts is
inevitable and thus it would be useful to predict what type of clarification
will be forthcoming.
Initially, it should be recognized that the public housing tenant threat-
ened with eviction has a great deal at stake. In addition to the im-
measurable emotional implications of an eviction, the tenant is faced with
81226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
" 226 F.2d at 53. See also Housing Auth. v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883,
884, 279 P.2d 215, 216, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956):
We believe it fairly obvious that a public body, a housing authority as here,
does not possess the same freedom of action as a private landlord, who is at
liberty to select his tenants as he pleases, and in the absence of a letting for
a prescribed term, may terminate their tenancy either without any reason
or for any reason regardless how arbitrary or unreasonable it may be.
" Compare Housing Auth. v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963),
with Thomas v. Housing Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
" 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966).
"Id. at 400-01. See Chicago Housing Auth. v. Stewart, - Ill. 2d -, 237
N.E.2d 463 (1968); Lancaster Housing Auth. v. Gardner, 211 Pa. Super. 502,
240 A.2d 566 (1968).
1969]
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the task of relocating. Because of a critical housing shortage, he will
often have to be satisfied with a substandard dwelling at a higher rent
payment and his chances of ever being admitted to another public housing
project are severely diminished. 0 On the other hand, it is clear that
public housing authorities must have sufficient power to control their
internal affairs, to maintain order, and to protect project property.37
However, if the authorities impinge upon the rights and privileges of their
tenants in purportedly carrying out these functions, it is incumbent upon
the courts to intervene and protect these rights and privileges.,
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, it seems obvious that an
eviction based on an authority's displeasure with a tenant's exercise of
his constitutional rights cannot be upheld.39 "It is too late in the day to
doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."4 In fact,
in Thorpe the Court noted with approval the Housing Authority's con-
cession that "its power to evict is limited at least to the extent it may not
evict a tenant for engaging in constitutionally protected activity. .. .
This conclusion points up the need for affording the tenant notice and an
opportunity to be heard before he can be evicted. As the Court noted in
Thorpe: "[A] tenant would have considerable difficulty effectively de-
fending against such an . . . illegal eviction if the Authority were under
no obligation to disclose its reasons."
42
Assuming that a public housing authority cannot evict a tenant for
engaging in constitutionally protected activity, it remains to be determined
whether a public housing tenant can be evicted for any other reason or for
no reason at all. At the outset, it is important to distinguish the function
of a public landlord from that of a private landlord.
"6 Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants 990-91.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
'8 See Rosen 247.
For a recent case indicating that a private landlord may, under certain cir-
cumstances, be prohibited from evicting a tenant because of his constitutionally pro-
tected activities, see Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 690-99 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
40 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 & n.6 (1963). See also Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) ; NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551
(1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
41393 U.S. at 282-83 & n.44.
42Id. at 283. Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 362-63 (1963);
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 900 (1961)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Public housing authorities do not hold housing projects for profit and
so have no need for such broad freedom to terminate their relationship
with project residents. The authorities' only legitimate interest in their
property is in its usefulness as a tool of national and state housing
policies.... The public landlord, in short, does not require the broad
discretion of a private landlord.
43
Second, the old distinction between "right" and "privilege," including
the notion that constitutional limitations are not applicable to the denial
or revocation of a privilege,44 has lost much of its vitality.45 Because of
the obvious parallelism between the government as employer and the
government as landlord, the Court's language in Wieman v. Updegraff
4"
is relevant. "We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to
public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional pro:
tection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a
statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory. '47 Third, the argument
is often made that the lease provisions to which the public housing tenant
agrees determine the rights and incidents of his tenancy; consequently, a
reservation by the authority of the power to terminate on short notice is
exclusively controlling. However persuasive such an argument might be
in the case of a private landlord, it cannot be sustained where the landlord
is an arm of the government. "[T] he state cannot condition the granting
of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to
procedural due process."
48
In Thorpe the Court at least hinted at its recognition of these dis-
tinctions between public and private landlords. This hint came in the
form of a footnote citing the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in
" Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants 996-97.
"See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Van
Aystyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
"See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Willner v. Committee
on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958).
" 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
17 Id. at 192.
" Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1961). See
Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Auth., 29 A.D.2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1968).
[S]ince their landlord functions are incidental to the administration of
national and state laws, not the converse, courts should look beyond the terms
of 'leases' to the statutory standards which bind the administrator and to the
constitutional standards which the government must respect whenever and
through whomever it acts.
Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants 999-1000.
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the Court's previous Thorpe decision.49 In that opinion Justice Douglas
cited with approval the Rudder dictum that "the government as landlord
is still the government" and thus is subject to the constitutional limitations
of due process.50 Furthermore, the Court indicated its willingness when
the issue is properly before it to consider to what extent the constitu-
tional limitations of due process restrict a public housing authority in its
dealings with tenants.5
Meanwhile, public housing authorities are bound by the HUD circular
to give any tenant it wishes to evict notice of the reasons for the eviction
and an opportunity to respond. Therefore, the implementation and in-
terpretation of these requirements will, to a large extent, determine the
future role of the courts in litigation of this kind. 2 It seems almost
certain, however, that courts will be called upon to decide what types of
reasons are sufficient to evict a tenant from a public housing project and
to establish guidelines to insure that the tenant will be given a fair hearing
before he may be evicted. As to the proceeding, some sort of trial-type
hearing would seem to be appropriate, 3 with the tenant having an oppor-
tunity to present his case and to confront the authority with respect to
the legality and sufficiency of its reasons for the eviction. "4 Furthermore,
it is imperative that the public housing administrator urging eviction
should not be in a position to decide the legality and sufficiency of the
reasons underlying his decision. "That a conclusion satisfies one's private
conscience does not attest its reliability."55
It would be easy to criticize the Thorpe decision for not setting forth
the extent to which public housing authorities are bound by considera-
tions of due process, and such criticism will undoubtedly be forthcoming.
11 393 U.S. at 283 n.45.50 386 U.S. at 678.
393 U.S. at 289 n.49.02For an early interpretation of the circular, see Lancaster Housing Auth. v.
Gardner, 211 Pa. Super. 502, 240 A.2d 566 (1968).
' See Rosen 211.
' Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
"Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter continued:
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode
by which it was reached. Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and
self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better
instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth than to give a person
in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and an oppor-
tunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.
Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added).
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On the other hand, and perhaps..more importantly, the decision clearly
puts public housing officials on notice that their actions in the future will
be subject to judicial scrutiny. Hopefully, this factor will cause public
housing officials to reEvaluate their attitudes and to bring their policies
into line with the goals and purposes underlying the public housing pro-
gram.
56
Advocates of the system of justice found in the United States have
often compared it favorably with judicial practices in other countries.
Yet that very system has too often permitted those of our citizens who
are dependent on government assistance in such areas as public housing to
be treated "as nonpersons in a constitutional sense; as persons who have,
in return for welfare payments, surrendered to the state's social workers
their constitutional rights to privacy and personal security. ' '1 7 To permit
this state of affairs to continue would be intolerable.
We need not go so far as to embrace the argument that the state has a
constitutional duty to provide its indigent citizens with support; but if
the state chooses to do so, it must proceed with careful regard to the
rights of the recipients, for they, too, are persons within our constitu-
tional scheme. Indeed, it may be that in the final analysis, a nation is
measured-perhaps its future is determined-not by the protection
which its institutions afford to the rich and strong, but by the meticulous
care with which the rights of the weak and humble are safeguarded. 58
MICHAEL R. ABEL
Real Property-Tenancy by the Entirety in Real Property
During Marriage
In determining the respective rights and interests of husband and wife
(H and W) in jointly held real property, the common law accepted lit-
erally the Biblical statement that H and W are one. This legal fiction of
"unity of person" was utilized to vest title to the real property in H and
W simultaneously, i.e., both owned the whole estate with neither holding
"" "Because serious injury attends eviciton from public housing, the threat
of termination is a dangerous weapon. Used carelessly, it can create a hostile,
bitter atmosphere in a housing project. Tenants, made to feel insecure, begin
to distrust each other as well as project officials."
Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants 991.
11 Fortas 413.
r1_rd. at 414.
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